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## N/U

### N/U- Tech Focus Now

#### Non unique- NATO is already expanding its strategy to focus on emerging technology

Jon Harper 6/29/22

Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, NATO unveils new Strategic Concept, pledges support for new ‘defense innovation accelerator’; FedScoop; https://www.fedscoop.com/nato-unveils-strategic-concept-pledges-support-for-new-defense-innovation-accelerator/

NATO released its new Strategic Concept on Wednesday, and leaders are expected to offer pledges to establish a new “Defense Innovation Accelerator” for the North Atlantic.¶ The need for more focus and investment in emerging technology is a major theme of this week’s NATO Summit in Madrid, which President Biden is attending along with his European counterparts.¶ The innovation accelerator “will support NATO’s efforts to boost interoperability and ensure that every Ally has access to cutting-edge technological solutions for military needs,” according to a White House fact sheet released Wednesday.¶ The United States will contribute to the initiative by facilitating access to U.S. test centers and other technology “accelerator sites” in the “extensive and diverse U.S. innovation sector,” it said.¶ The military alliance is also launching a new innovation fund that will invest 1 billion Euros in startups and other organizations developing “dual-use” emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday during a press conference.¶ Together with the new innovation accelerator, the fund will help the alliance “harness the best new technology for transatlantic security,” he said.¶ NATO’s new Strategic Concept, released Wednesday, states: “Emerging and disruptive technologies bring both opportunities and risks. They are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance and becoming key arenas of global competition. Technological primacy increasingly influences success on the battlefield.”

### N/U- Cyber Focus

#### NATO already expanding its strategic doctrine to center cyber defense- it’s a key part of their deterrence strategy

Jon Harper 6/29/22

Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, NATO unveils new Strategic Concept, pledges support for new ‘defense innovation accelerator’; FedScoop; https://www.fedscoop.com/nato-unveils-strategic-concept-pledges-support-for-new-defense-innovation-accelerator/

Plans also call for enhancing cybersecurity.¶ “Building on last year’s adoption of a new Cyber Defense Policy for NATO, Allied leaders will endorse a new action plan to strengthen cyber cooperation across the political, military, and technical levels,” the White House said. “As an operational domain for NATO, cyber will also be a key component of NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture. Building on lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, Allies will decide at the Summit to use NATO as a coordination platform for offering national assets to build and exercise a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond to a serious cyber-attack. The United States will offer robust national capabilities as part of this support network.”¶ Cyberspace is now “contested at all times,” the Strategic Concept stated.¶ “Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities,” it said. The alliance intends to expedite its “digital transformation,” adapt the NATO Command Structure for the “information age” and enhance its cyber defenses, networks and infrastructure.¶ “We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights,” the document said.¶ The new Strategic Concept — the first update in more than a decade — also focuses on space as a key technology area and warfighting domain.¶ “We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools,” it said, noting that “a single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty” and trigger collective defense responses that could include armed conflict.¶ The alliance also intends to boost the resilience of its space and cyber capabilities which are at risk of being attacked.

#### NATO already has EDT at the center of its strategic doctrine for the next 15 years

JOHN CURRAN 7/1/22

NATO Sets $1 Billion Defense Tech Fund, Cites AI, Space Tech Needs; MeriTalk; https://www.meritalk.com/articles/nato-sets-1-billion-defense-tech-fund-cites-ai-space-tech-needs/

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is launching a new one billion euro (U.S. $1.04 billion) defense technologies investment fund that is likely to cover tech including artificial intelligence, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg said on June 30 at a press conference in Madrid.¶ ¶ The investment fund is separate from the new Defense Innovation Accelerator unveiled earlier this week. NATO announced plans for the innovation accelerator on June 29 as part of a new “strategic concept” that names Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to NATO allies’ security and stability and wraps cybersecurity initiatives more tightly into the alliance’s strategy.¶ ¶ The NATO Innovation Fund “is unique,” Stoltenberg said on June 30. “It is the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund ever.”¶ ¶ He said the fund will invest its money in “early-stage start-ups, and other deep-tech funds across 22 participating nations.” The fund is geared to operate over a 15-year period.¶ ¶ The goal of the effort, he said, will be “harnessing the best of new technology for transatlantic security,” and “maintaining our technological edge [that] has helped to keep our Alliance strong and our nations safe for more than seventy years.”¶ ¶ “Today, nations that do not share our values, like Russia and China, are challenging that lead in everything from Artificial Intelligence to space technologies,” Stoltenberg said. “It is essential that we do everything in our power to remain at the forefront of innovation and technology.”¶ ¶ “This Fund, alongside DIANA, NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, will help to do just that,” he said. “The NATO Innovation Fund will help bring to life those nascent technologies that have the power to transform our security in the decades to come.”

### N/U- Greece/Turkey Disputes

#### Nonunique- NATO currently divided over Turkey conflict

#### Daily Sabah ’22 (Staff written, “NATO urges Turkey, Greece to resolve disagreements over Aegean,” Daily Sabah, 2022.06.15, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/nato-urges-turkey-greece-to-resolve-disagreements-over-aegean)-> HL

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg on Tuesday urged Turkey and Greece to resolve their disagreements over the Aegean Sea, where the two are at loggerheads over islands and airspace. "Diverse views and debate are an essential part of our democracies," the head of the trans-Atlantic military alliance told Greek news agency ANA. But, he said, "we urge Greece and Turkey to solve their differences in the Aegean in a spirit of trust and Allied solidarity." "That means restraint and moderation, and refraining from any actions or rhetoric that could escalate the situation." Stoltenberg's comments came two weeks after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Turkey would no longer participate in regular high-level meetings with Greek leaders intended to foster cooperation between the two countries. Erdoğan raised the stakes last week, warning Greece to demilitarize its Aegean islands and saying he was “not joking.” He spoke during Turkish wargames near the Greek islands that included an amphibious landing scenario. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis responded that he would not engage in a "ping-pong" of personal insults with Erdoğan. The two NATO allies have long been at odds over a number of issues including offshore rights, ownership of uninhabited islets, competing claims over jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping claims over their continental shelves, maritime boundaries, airspace, energy, the ethnically split island of Cyprus, the status of the islands in the Aegean Sea and migrants. They have come close to war three times in the past half-century, while NATO stepped in when a dispute over drilling rights for potential oil and gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea led to a tense naval standoff in the summer of 2020. Turkey says Greece is stationing troops on islands in the Aegean in violation of peace treaties signed after the World Wars, demanding that Greece demilitarize its eastern islands, citing the 20th-century treaties that ceded sovereignty of the islands to Greece. Greece counters that the islands need defenses given threats of war from Turkey, which has NATO's second-biggest military and maintains a large landing fleet on its Aegean coast. Turkey in recent months has stepped up criticism of Greece stationing troops on islands in the eastern Aegean, near the Turkish coast and in many cases visible from shore. These islands were required to be demilitarized under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Treaty of Paris, so any troops or weapons on the islands are strictly forbidden. Starting with the Treaty of London in 1913, the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands was restricted and their demilitarized status was confirmed with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Lausanne pact established a political balance between the two countries by harmonizing vital interests, including those in the Aegean. The 1947 Treaty of Paris, which ceded the Dodecanese islands from Italy to Greece, also confirmed their demilitarized status. However, Greece argues that the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits should be applied in this case, while Ankara says Greece’s obligation to disarm the islands remains unchanged under the Montreux Convention, highlighting that there is no provision that differentiates it from the Treaty of Lausanne on the issue.

### Deterrence Low Now

#### NATO is divided now and deterrence is low- only cooperation can solve

Mcnamara 22 [Thomas E. McNamara is a United States diplomat and State Department official. “Putin's Challenge to NATO and to the Global Enterprise'”. 5-1-2022. ProQuest. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2658311974/fulltext/6E0C463534C946DDPQ/1?accountid=3672. Accessed 7-1-2022; MJen]

The West, however, must deal with Putin as he is. He has legitimate complaints about short-sighted Western policies. For years the U.S. has devalued diplomacy out of ignorance and hubris, which undermines national security and NATO. NATO and EU expansions were good ideas, but were uncoordinated, and poorly developed and executed. Abandoning most arms control, which benefited American-Russian mutual security, was a major mistake, leaving our European allies to face Putin's missile threats. None of those, however, justifies Putin's war in Ukraine. Putin's unilateral, military threats fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War order, not just in Ukraine. The West's biggest mistake, however, was failure to maintain a credible NATO deterrent posture in Europe. European nations allowed their military capabilities to deteriorate; some became impotent. The Alliance was blind and unresponsive to leadership and policy changes in Moscow over two decades. Putin is not Gorbachev or Yeltsin; yet NATO acted as though he were. NATO ignored U.S. urgings to strengthen itself, and the warnings of its East Central European members even after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and take-over of part of the Donbas. These errors make NATO partly responsible for the invasion of Ukraine - a sin of omission. The immediate reaction of NATO to the invasion is a plus, provided it is a first step of a new era in European security thinking and NATO policies.

## Links

### At: AI/Cyber Link

#### No link- NATO is unified in its integration of cyber and AI into the alliance mission

Nick Fouriezos 6/29/22

Atlanta-based writer with bylines from every US state and six continents; Blinken: NATO is ‘more united, more focused’ after historic summit; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/blinken-nato-is-more-united-more-focused-after-historic-summit/

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken pushed for world leaders to continue sustained action—in supporting Ukraine, in pressuring Russia, and in reinforcing NATO on the heels of its historic decision to invite Finland and Sweden to join the defensive alliance. ¶ “NATO is emerging from this summit more united, more focused, and with more assets to deal with a multiplicity of challenges,” Blinken said, praising the solidarity shown in this week’s gathering in Madrid. ¶ The conversations at the two-day NATO Public Forum, taking place on the sidelines of the Madrid summit, brought together a number of global leaders in person and virtually, including US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who reaffirmed US support for Article 5, the principle of collective defense, as “ironclad.” ¶ “This alarming challenge to national sovereignty must be met by a unified global commitment to peace and security,” Pelosi said of Russian aggression, while also calling for action to defend against China through continued “cooperation with our Asia-Pacific partners to bolster cybersecurity, counter disinformation, and preserve our collective defense.” ¶ This week, NATO nations agreed on a new Strategic Concept that declares the Alliance’s priorities in staving off military and economic threats from Russia and China, reasserting shared democratic values and human-rights protections, and battling new threats from the realms of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence.¶ “All of these things are challenges we have to meet and face,” Blinken said, “but we know that we’re going to be more effective in doing it if we actually have a shared, common approach.”

### At: Cyber Link

#### Cooperation on cybersecurity is key to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense mission

Franklin D. Kramer, Lauren Speranza, and Conor Rodihan et al in 2020

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a board director of the Atlantic Council;¶ Lauren M. Speranza is director of Transatlantic Defense and Security at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA);¶ Conor Rodihan is an assistant director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative; NATO needs continuous responses in cyberspace; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-continuous-responses-in-cyberspace/

President-Elect Joe Biden’s transition team has declared cyber threats as “one of the defining challenges of our time.” In its early days, the incoming US administration must take on cybersecurity threats as one of its key priorities. Nowhere will that effort be more important than with the United States’ closest Allies at NATO, a cornerstone for Western security. Today, NATO’s security is threatened by Russia’s and China’s continuous cyberattacks on the Alliance and its members. To accomplish its mission of deterrence and defense, NATO needs to implement a strategy of proactive, continuous responses to China and Russia in cyberspace, where great power competition is playing out in real time.¶ Russia and China challenge NATO and its members in cyberspace on a daily basis, as part of ongoing hybrid campaigns to undermine the transatlantic community. The Kremlin’s actions have involved intrusions into Allies’ critical infrastructures, manipulating Allies’ elections through hacks and disinformation, and even blocking GPS information critical to NATO activities. The Chinese government has engaged in cyber espionage against Allies’ military capabilities; intellectual property theft related to sensitive technologies, industries, and infrastructure; and disinformation against transatlantic countries, including around the coronavirus. These efforts to weaken NATO countries and Alliance cohesion represent a persistent threat to Allied security.¶ NATO has recognized the collective dangers of these hybrid attacks in cyberspace. Up to this point, however, the Alliance has taken a reactive approach, responding as if Russian and Chinese cyber attacks are each isolated incidents. But because Russian and Chinese cyber efforts are part of continuous campaigns directed at the overall capability of the Alliance, NATO’s response has been insufficient, failing to reduce or dissuade further attacks. To assure the security of its members going forward, NATO needs its own continuous response campaign to these threats.¶ President-elect Biden and his team have pledged to renew US leadership in cooperation with Allies and partners. That agenda should start at NATO, and a key focus should be on cybersecurity. In early NATO meetings, the Biden administration should champion a cybersecurity continuous-response campaign, built around three key actions.

### At: EDT Link

#### Integrating EDT’s into NATO’s strategic doctrine is key to maintain the alliance’s effective deterrence

JORDAN BECKER, DOUGLAS LUTE, AND SIMON SMITH et al 6/28/22

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DON’T LET RUSSIA DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/

When NATO members agree on a new Strategic Concept at their summit in Madrid, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will dominate the discussion. But with this existential crisis rightfully taking center stage, other threats have not gone away. The challenge for NATO is to situate Russia’s invasion in a wider strategic context, addressing other key issues before they create new existential crises in the future.¶ What does this mean in practice? We contend that despite the current centrality of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Sino-American rivalry is likely to drive U.S. national security thinking in the coming decades. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept should address this reality. Among the many challenges in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, China’s designs on Taiwan figure most prominently. China is watching the Russo-Ukrainian war closely, seeking to draw strategic lessons. This dynamic need not be catastrophic for European and trans-Atlantic security. It creates opportunities for E.U.-NATO cooperation and greater European strategic autonomy (or strategic responsibility) in the context of an enduring trans-Atlantic bond. Europe and Asia are increasingly linked as two theaters in a global system hinging on the United States and anchored in its alliances in both regions. The strategic concept should thus lay out a vision for how NATO can simultaneously compete with both China and Russia.¶ There are also several specific threats and challenges that the 2022 Strategic Concept should address. First, allies should tackle the effects of emerging and emerged disruptive technologies on strategic, defense, and force planning. Second, adversaries are increasingly using high- and low-tech approaches short of armed conflict to disrupt national politics and daily life in Western democracies. Enhancing and coordinating resilience across the alliance should be a goal of the strategic concept. Third, money remains the sinew of war. Whether it is investment in national and common-funded capabilities, or transfers to partners like Ukraine, ample and efficient spending is a requirement for a successful strategy. Fourth, NATO should continue to grapple with the distinct but related challenges of terrorism and irregular warfare.

#### Cooperation on EDTs is key to deterrence- shows resolve and willingness to defend the alliance

JORDAN BECKER, DOUGLAS LUTE, AND SIMON SMITH et al 6/28/22

Jordan Becker is an academy professor and director of the Social Science Research Lab at the United States Military Academy, West Point. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and IHEDN and IRSEM at the French École Militaire. Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former U.S. permanent representative to NATO and retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of lieutenant general. Simon Smith is an associate professor at Staffordshire University and is the editor-in-chief of Defence Studies.

DON’T LET RUSSIA DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/

A significant strategic concern for NATO allies is to avoid precipitating a Russian-Chinese authoritarian alignment. While Russia and China face distinct strategic challenges of their own and their “unlimited partnership” has appeared to stumble upon some limits, their continued pursuit of emerging, disruptive technologies and their authoritarian models of governance present significant risks to NATO allies. These models, coupled with Russia and China’s shared willingness to undermine national and international institutions in the trans-Atlantic community, mean that the most daunting threat NATO faces may be to its foundational values. Incorporating these core values into strategy and policy will be a key task for the 2022 Strategic Concept.¶ New Domains¶ Whether in coordination or not, China and Russia will undoubtedly continue to challenge allies in domains like space and cyber using emerging and emerged technologies. Dealing with such challenges is core NATO business — grounded in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and resting primarily with national authorities. The new Strategic Concept should aim to integrate these relatively new domains while responding to disruptive technologies as well. Allies must endeavor to reach a “pre-crisis” consensus on what space and cyber actions would constitute an “armed attack” in accordance with Article 5. This kind of crisis decision-making is a core function of NATO’s political and military headquarters. Such agreement, when paired with improved national capabilities, would contribute to deterrence by communicating resolve to adversaries. Improved capabilities themselves will only arise through public-private partnership to maintain a technological edge. A common strategic culture of innovation, much of which arises from the private sector, is a key advantage that NATO has — and should retain — over its adversaries. Such innovation has been on display in the Russo-Ukrainian war and will doubtless be essential in future conflicts.

#### Incorporations of EDTs raise NATO functionality and strength.

Borchert et. al 21 (Heiko Borchert, John Allen, Marcin Zaborowski; Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs. He is Associate Partner of Wise Pens International, a European consultancy specializing on maritime security policy and advice, and member of the board of the Journal for Foreign and Security Policy; John Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces; Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). In 2001, he received his Ph. D. in International Studies from the University of Birmingham in the UK; “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address”; 12/13/21; https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address)//akg

Emerging technologies are the geo-economics Achilles heel NATO needs to address to deter aggressors, write General John Allen, Heiko Borchert and Marcin Zaborowski. General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC. To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment. To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies. The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element. Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks. The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies. Therefore, the Alliance needs to step up activities with the European Commission, which works on a classification system to identify ESG-compliant activities, to make defence investments compatible. Third, business is the first line of defence in a geoeconomic world, and NATO needs a platform to discuss geoeconomics with business. Today, the NATO Industry Forum is the leading gathering to address defence industrial matters with defence companies. However, the emphasis on emerging technologies underlines the importance of non-defence companies. Therefore, NATO should envisage a new special format of the North Atlantic Council to meet with the NATO Industry Forum members – and possibly also the European Commission – to allow state and corporate leaders to jointly engage on the proposed economic security agenda. Fourth, strategic-level public-private dialogue also breathes new life into deepening cooperation with the private sector. NATO should become an early adopter of the solutions developed with allied money. Making NATO the launch customer sends important market signals and provides companies with an initial track record confirming the relevance of their solutions. In addition, the Alliance should step up efforts to incorporate business into military operations. Logistics companies already play a crucial role, and traditional defence businesses provide frontline support. The next stage comes with closely integrating digital companies to leverage their contribution. But for non-defence companies to provide frontline support, NATO not only needs the right mindset, but the Alliance also needs to think about incentives such as covering personnel risks on overseas deployments. Finally, NATO’s ability to stimulate innovation and ensure economic security also depends on how it does business. Critically, NATO needs to strive for a mission and capabilities-based innovation portfolio that maximises the value of allied money. NATO may take a page from the financial services industry and use a real options approach to manage technological risk and drive technology development. This approach prices technology building blocks like financial options, advances risk mitigation, speeds up technology adoption and gives force planners and developers more leeway to maximise input and output. In addition, NATO should offer strategic hedging solutions for defence critical raw materials by combining corporate demand estimates with AI-based insights on financial and raw material markets. This will facilitate optimal, company-tailored hedging strategies to mitigate the corporate security of supply and price risks. Overall, NATO’s relevance in the 21st century remains tackling defence challenges in a new strategic environment, increasingly defined by emerging and rapidly changing technologies and the profoundly important role of the private sector. To this purpose, NATO has embraced innovation and emerging technologies. This step, however, makes NATO subject to a new geoeconomic dynamic that unfolds around competition for standards, business models, technologies, and supply chains. This requires NATO to make economic security a core element of its new Strategic Concept to ensure NATO’s edge. In turn, this will provide a sound basis for expanded cooperation with the European Union, and make NATO an esteemed partner of the new Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council, the new body set up to enhance the EU-U.S. technology, economic, and trade partnership.

## Impacts

### NATO Deterrence Fails- Underfunded

#### No NATO Deterrence- underfunding

Franklin D. Kramer and Barry Pavel June 13, 2022 [Distinguished Fellow Board Director Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Senior Vice President and Director Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war; Atlantic Council;]

As a starting point, it is important to recognize that almost all NATO nations, other than the United States, have—in the words of a recent European Union (EU) analysis—had “years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military” capabilities.1 Most importantly in the context of the current environment, the “capacity to operate full-spectrum and at high intensity was neglected.”2 That neglect, and the concomitant need to focus on reestablishing the capacity for high-intensity battle, is well recognized by NATO military leaders. For example, France’s “Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff” specifically sets forth the requirement to be able to “respond…in a high-intensity conflict.”3 Yet, as a recent RAND report stated: France’s capacity to sustain a high-end, conventional conflict nonetheless is limited. The French military might be able to accomplish all its assigned missions at once, but it lacks depth, meaning that such demanding operations would quickly exhaust both its human and material resources.” What is true for France is similarly true for other European militaries, including—perhaps most importantly—Germany, which has suffered from years of underspending and strategic neglect. In addition, while operating at a different scale in terms of resources and reach, the US military itself is insufficiently prepared, in particular, in terms of its munitions and supply inventories for a sustained, high-intensity conflict. However, these deficiencies are entirely remediable if appropriate measures are taken. The initial requirement for success in high-intensity conflict is, of course, simply to have sufficient weapons and support available. The EU analysis includes the need to “[r]eplenish stockpiles” among the “most urgent capability gaps.”4 Taking lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, those stockpiles should include anti-armor capabilities and man-portable and medium-range air defenses, each of which adds to the maneuver capability and lethality of ground units. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles for both sensing and attack and long-range fires have proved to be key battlefield weapons, and air defenses for rear areas are also critical. Finally, inventories of precision-guided munitions for air forces need to be substantially increased. All of the foregoing should be undertaken in the context of a potential conflict that, as the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated, can extend for multiple months—and perhaps even years. So, inventories and replenishment capacities need to be established with such a timeframe in mind. NATO should utilize the defense planning process to set the necessary targets. There should be no doubt, however, that achieving the requisite level of capability will require significant defense-budget increases, as the gap has been very substantial. As the EU analysis states: Had all Member States spent 2% of their GDP on defence with 20% dedicated to investment, since 2006 until 2020, this would have resulted in an additional approximately EUR 1,100 billion for defence, of which around EUR 270 billion on investment.” As that analysis makes clear, just meeting NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending goal will not be sufficient to resolve the substantial readiness and sustainment deficiencies in any reasonable timeframe. To be sure, the 2-percent goal is important, but NATO needs to establish an additional readiness/sustainment initiative over a shorter period—perhaps three or four years—that would substantially increase the readiness of national forces. The large increases in Germany’s investment budget provide a model for a budgetary approach that should be undertaken by other countries. Germany has promised to reach 2 percent annually, including by spending one hundred billion euros over a four-year period on investment.5 Other countries should follow the German approach and establish special investment-funding streams focused on readiness and sustainability that would be designed to resolve the shortfalls in a three-to-four-year period. Along with the funding increases, and as an additional part of a NATO readiness/sustainment effort, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) should be given the task (and authority) to review and report on the readiness of the forces that will be called upon in the event of a contingency. A focused effort on readiness and sustainability, generated through the defense-planning process and overseen by the SACEUR, will significantly enhance NATO’s deterrent and defense posture.